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CURETON v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: WAS THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OUT OF
BOUNDS WHEN IT ENJOINED THE NCAA
FROM CONTINUED OPERATION OF
PROPOSITION 16?
"Success isn't measured by the position you reach in life; it's mea-
sured by the obstacles you overcome. " i
Booker T. Washington
I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone loves college basketball. It generates a certain fever
that cannot be found anywhere else in the realm of sports. Surely,
no NBA rivalry can match the intensity that accompanies the
Tarheels when they travel to Cameron.2 Few fans of professional
football express their unconditional love and deep devotion for
their teams like the people in Alabama when they are gearing up
for the Iron Bowl.3 It is college sports that causes fans to travel
frequently across their state (and neighboring states) with their
faces painted and with multi-colored flags sticking out of their car
windows. It is loyalty to the institution that causes this madness.
The institution is the common thread or bond that exists between
the Regular Joe and Freight Train Joe, the fullback.
In the frenzy of college athletics, the fundamental purpose of
the institution, education, is often forgotten. The National Col-
legiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") has, through the advice and
1. The Book of Southern Wisdom: Common Sense and Uncommon Genius
from 101 Great Southerners 44 (Criswell Freeman ed. 1994).
2. For all readers unfamiliar with North Carolina college basketball, the
author is referring to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill's team,
whose mascot is the Tarheel, traveling to their rival Duke University's Cameron
Indoor Stadium for a college basketball game, which are notoriously well played
and highly anticipated.
3. The Iron Bowl is the annual football game between University of Alabama
and Auburn University. Until 1989, the game was traditionally played in
Birmingham, Alabama, which has been referred to as the "Steel City of the
South" because it was built around an iron ore deposit. The rivalry between the
football programs at Alabama and Auburn is considered to be one of the most
intense in the South.
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support of the universities, employed Proposition 16' to ensure
that student-athletes are not exploited and education is not forgot-
ten. However, in Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion,5 Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter of the Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania enjoined the NCAA from use of Proposition 16, find-
ing it was in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
("Title Vr').6 In granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the
court held the NCAA received federal financial assistance under
Title VI 7 and Proposition 16 had an "unjustified disparate impact
against African-Americans in violation of Title VI."I
Judge Buckwalter's decision is incorrect for three reasons.
First, by finding the NCAA subject to suit under "the indirect
recipient theory" or "the controlling authority theory,"9 the court
applied Title VI too broadly. Second, in determining that Proposi-
tion 16 has an unjustified disparate impact, the court failed to rec-
ognize that the NCAA rule was justified by an "educational
necessity"' ° and was more effective than alternatives proffered by
the plaintiffs. 1 Finally, there are important public policy reasons
why the court should be deferential to the educational institutions
and the NCAA when it comes to setting academic standards. 2
II. BACKGROUND
The NCAA is a nonprofit, unincorporated, voluntary associa-
tion made up of more than 1,100 colleges and universities and 100
athletic conferences. 13 Currently, the NCAA generates $283 mil-
lion dollars in revenue and holds 81 championships each year.' 4
The NCAA receives annual dues from its members in an amount
4. NCAA Bylaw sec. 14.3.
5. Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa.
1999).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964) (prohibiting discrimination "on the ground of
race ... under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.").
7. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
8. Id. at 715.
9. Id. at 696.
10. Id. at 712.
11. Id. at 714.
12. Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Allows NCAA to Keep Prop 16 For Now, 220
Legal Intelligencer 619, Mar. 31, 1999 (referring to a quote by David Bruton of
Drinker Biddle & Reath, attorneys for the NCAA).
13. Darryl Van Duch, NCAA's Lawyer is Tops on the Court, 21 Nat'l L.J. 39,
May 24, 1999, at B1.
14. Id.
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determined by the members.15 The active members consist of
four-year colleges and universities, which are divided, "for pur-
poses of bylaw legislation and competition in intercollegiate cham-
pionship events, into Division I, II, and III, with further
classification of Division I members into Division I-A Football and
Division I-AA Football."1 6 Presently, there are 302 Division I
schools. 17
The NCAA sets the standards that govern the intercollegiate
play of its members, including requiring that "by joining the
NCAA, each member agrees to abide by and enforce [the Associa-
tion's] rules."' 8 Some of the bylaws are applicable to all members
of the NCAA. However, each division may choose to adopt bylaws
that apply only to its division.' 9 Proposition 16 was applicable
only to Division I schools (as was its precursor, proposition 48).20
These rules set the academic standards for freshmen eligibility. 2 '
Freshmen were not allowed to participate in varsity athletics
prior to 1971.22 When freshmen were initially allowed to partici-
pate, there was a lack of governing standards that the majority of
the NCAA members believed led to the exploitation of many stu-
dent-athletes. For example, Kevin Ross "attended Creighton
[University] for four years on a basketball scholarship only to
embarrassingly emerge on [a] '60 Minutes' segment [] function-
ally illiterate."23 The NCAA had two stated goals in mind when it
created Proposition 48 and Proposition 16: "(1) raising of gradua-
tion rates, and (2) allowing more individuals access to the finite
number of athletic opportunities available."24 In the Cureton
case, the NCAA relied heavily on the first goal as the principal
reason for Proposition 16.25
15. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
16. Id.
17. NCAA Denied, (posted Mar. 16, 1999) <http://cnnsi.com/more/news/1999/
03/16/ncaa testscores/index.html>.
18. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183, (1988).
See NCAA Const. art. 1.2(h), 1.3.2 (1993-1994).
19. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Mark Coatney, Closer Look: High Jumpers, Low Scores (Mar. 11, 1999)
<http://cgi.pathfinder.com/time/daily/special/look/0,2633,21335-2,00.html>.
24. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d. at 705.
25. Id.
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In the 1986-1987 academic year, Division I NCAA members
adopted Proposition 48 which "require[d] high school graduates to
present a 2.000 GPA in 11 academic core courses and a minimum
score of 700 on the SAT... before being allowed to participate in
freshmen athletics."26 By the 1988-1989 academic year, the Prop-
osition 48 requirements were phased in and consequently gradua-
tion rates increased, especially among African-American
athletes.27
Proposition 16, which modified the Proposition 48 require-
ments, was created in 1992 and was fully phased in by the 1996-
1997 academic year.28 Under the new rule, high school athletes
had to take 13 academic core courses in order to be eligible to play
their first year. 29 Proposition 16 also introduced the "initial eligi-
bility index" or what has been termed the "sliding scale":
Using the index, the student-athlete could establish eligibility
with a GPA as low as 2.000, provided the student also presented
an SAT score of 1010 or an ACT sum... score of 86. At the other
end of the index, a minimum 820 SAT or 68 ACT sum score estab-
lishe[d] the floor for students with GPAs of 2.5000 or higher. 30
If the student did not meet the requirements, then the stu-
dent could not participate in varsity athletics during his/her fresh-
men year, nor could the student receive "athletically related
financial aid."31
Under the higher standards of Proposition 16, four African-
American student-athletes (Tai Kwan Cureton, Leatrice Shaw,
Andrea Gardner, and Alexander Wesby) were "denied the oppor-
tunity to compete in intercollegiate athletics during their fresh-
man year at Division I schools, denied admission to Division I
schools, denied athletic scholarships by Division I schools ... and/
or denied recruiting opportunities by Division I schools."32 All
four student-athletes failed to meet the minimum standardized
test cutoff score (820 SAT or 68 ACT).3 3 The student-athletes
brought a putative class action lawsuit against the NCAA alleging
that Proposition 16 (more specifically, the 820 SAT cutoff score)
26. Id. at 690.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 690-691.
31. Id. at 690.
32. Id. at 689.
33. Id.
236 [Vol. 22:233
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had an unjustified disparate impact on African-American student-
athletes and was, therefore, an unlawful denial of educational
opportunities.3 4
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The suit was filed January 8, 1997 by Tai Kwan Cureton and
Leatrice Shaw "individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated. 35 On October 9, 1997, the Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania denied the NCAA's motion to dismiss and granted
partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the
NCAA is a program covered by the "catch-all" provision (subsec-
tion 4) of Title VI.36 The court also held that a private cause of
action exists under Title VI, but in order to prevail, the plaintiffs,
at trial on the merits, had to prove: "(1) that the NCAA receives
federal financial assistance; and (2) that its minimum test score
requirement violates Title VI... because the requirement has an
unjustifiable disparate impact on African-American student ath-
letes."37 In December of 1998, the court granted plaintiffs' motion
to add party-plaintiffs Andrea Gardner and Alexander Wesby. 3s
On March 8, 1999, the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania
granted summary judgement in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining
the NCAA from using Proposition 16 and denying the "motion for
a stay of the amended injunction pending an appeal to the Third
Circuit."39 On July 1, 1999, the District Court granted in part
plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 40  The Third Circuit
stayed the injunction pending an appeal. 4 '
34. Id.
35. Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1998 WL 961387 (E.D. Pa.
1998).
36. Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1997 WL 634376, at *2
(E.D. Pa. 1997).
37. Id.
38. Cureton, 1998 WL 961387 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
39. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
40. Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9706
(E.D. Pa. 1999).
41. NCAA Could Have New Standards Ready by September, (Mar. 31, 1999)
<http://cnnsi.com/more/news/1999/03/31/testscores.html>.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Should the NCAA be Subject to Suit under Title IV?
The NCAA is a private association.42 In order to be subject to
suit under Title VI, the association must fall within the gamut of
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), which prohibits discrimination "on the
ground of race.., under any program or activity receiving finan-
cial assistance."43 Therefore, the NCAA must receive federal
financial assistance in order to be subject to the "strictures" of
Title VI.44
In NCAA v. Smith,45 a case substantially similar to Cureton,
the NCAA was sued for sexual discrimination under Title IX (a
provision that is identical to Title VI, "except for the substitution
of the word 'sex' . . . to replace the words 'race, color, or national
origin'").4 6 In both Smith and Cureton, in order to prevail, the one
bringing suit had to show that the association was a recipient of
federal funds.
In Smith, the Supreme Court, relying on two prior decisions,
defined what qualified an entity as a recipient of federal financial
assistance. "Entities that receive federal assistance, whether
directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the
meaning of Title IX; entities that only benefit economically from
federal assistance are not."47 The court went on to state "if any
part of the NCAA received federal assistance, all NCAA opera-
tions would be subject to Title IX."48
Smith's principle argument was that the NCAA indirectly
received federal financial assistance because they received dues
from federally funded institutions and some of the dues came out
of the federal funds allocated to those schools.49 Disagreeing with
her argument, the Supreme Court held that "[d]ues payments
from recipients of federal funds . . .do not suffice to render the
dues recipient subject to Title IX."1° The court was clear that so
long as the federal funds were not "earmarked" for NCAA dues,
42. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
43. Id. at 692.
44. Id.
45. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 119 S. Ct. 924 (1999).
46. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
47. Smith, 119 S.Ct. at 929. See also Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984); U.S Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
48. Smith, , 119 S.Ct. at 928.
49. Id. at 927.
50. Id. at 926.
238 [Vol. 22:233
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the NCAA only indirectly benefited from the federal assistance.5 1
The court found this, in itself, insufficient to subject the NCAA to
Title IX strictures. 2
In Cureton, the plaintiffs anchored their attack on the same
grounds as Smith, arguing "the NCAA indirectly receives federal
financial assistance because the NCAA acts as the member insti-
tutions' agent with respect to the governance of intercollegiate
athletics."53 In accordance with the Smith ruling, the Eastern
District Court of Pennsylvania found that this was insufficient to
bring the NCAA within the coverage of Title VI."' However, it
indicated that the plaintiffs had laid a good foundation with their
argument and with additional facts and theories they would possi-
bly be able to trigger Title VI.55
The plaintiffs proffered four alternative theories to bolster
their argument. 6 Judge Buckwalter relied on three in finding the
NCAA subject to suit under Title VI:
that the NCAA indirectly receives federal financial assistance
through the Fund [National Youth Sports Program Fund]57 due to
the NCAA's complete control over the Fund; (3) that members
schools who receive federal funds have created and compromise
the NCAA and that the NCAA governs its members with respect
to athletic rules; and (4) that recipients of federal financial assist-
ance have ceded controlling authority over a federally funded pro-
gram to the NCAA, who then becomes subject to Title VI
regardless of whether it is itself a recipient. 5s
The court dubbed the second theory the "indirect recipient
theory." 9 The rationale behind the theory was that although the
Fund received the Community Services Block Grant distributed
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services,
it was the NCAA who exercised control over the grant.6 0 The
51. Id. at 929.
52. Id. at 930.
53. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
54. Id. at 693.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 713.
57. "The Fund is an enrichment for economically disadvantaged youths that
provides summer education and sports instruction on the campuses of NCAA
member and non-member institutions of higher education." Cureton, 37 F.Supp.
2d at 692 n.3.
58. Id. at 694.
59. Id. at 696.
60. Id. at 694.
1999] 239
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court accepted this theory finding the Fund to be a "mere conduit"
for the federal assistance and that "the Fund [was] ultimately con-
trolled by the NCAA."61
Alternatively, the court found the third and fourth theories
sufficient to trigger Title VI.62 It found the theories to be essen-
tially identical "differing only in degree" and accepted these collec-
tively as the "controlling authority theory."63 The court held that
"the NCAA is subject to suit under Title VI irrespective of whether
it receives federal funds, directly or indirectly, because member
schools (who themselves indisputably receive federal funds) have
ceded controlling authority over federally funded programs to the
NCAA."64 It found this argument persuasive because the NCAA
had the power to adopt and enforce its legislation against its mem-
ber schools, which were each, in themselves, "undeniably subject
to Title VI."6 5 To be precise, the NCAA was the "controlling
authority" because the member institutions had delegated author-
ity to the association and all of the members were forced to abide
by the association's rules or suffer "grave consequences."66
The Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania's conclusion may
be due in large part to the fact that the United States Supreme
Court, in Smith, refused to decide whether the NCAA was an
"indirect recipient" of federal assistance through the Fund.67 The
Supreme Court also did not address the question of whether the
NCAA was the "controlling authority" of federally funded
programs.
In regard to the "indirect recipient" theory, the District Court
interpreted the Smith ruling as a loophole to the underlying rule
that organizations that only benefit economically from federal
assistance are not recipients within the meaning of Title [VI].68 It
conceded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the Fund
was the "alter ego" of the NCAA and that the association was
directly receiving the federal grant through the Fund.69 The court
further conceded that the Fund was managed by an entirely sepa-
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 696.
66. Id. at 695-96.
67. Smith, 119 S.Ct. at 930.
68. Id. at 929.
69. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
240 [Vol. 22:233
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rate organization.7" Nonetheless, the court found that the NCAA
was an indirect recipient because "the fund [was] ultimately being
controlled by the NCAA.'' 71 Judge Buckwalter's reasoning in
Cureton is inconsistent with Smith for one important reason: if it
is conceded that the Fund is managed by a separate organization,
then the best categorization of the NCAA is as a beneficiary of the
federal funding, not as a recipient. The situation is analogous
with schools that receive federal funding and then pay their
NCAA dues with that money. Clearly, if the NCAA is not classi-
fied as an indirect recipient of those funds, then it should also not
be considered an indirect recipient of the Community Service
Block Grant. The plaintiffs argument in Cureton seems far more
attenuated to the underlying rule than the theory that was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Smith. It would have been more
accurate if Judge Buckwalter had interpreted the second argu-
ment as a "controlling authority" theory, rather than the "indirect
recipient" theory accepted by the court.
Through the "controlling authority" theory, the District Court
subjected the NCAA to Title VI "irrespective of its receipt of fed-
eral funds."7 2 This argument is unpersuasive and is in direct con-
flict with the NCAA Constitution, which states that "the control
and responsibility for the conduct of intercollegiate athletics shall
be exercised by the institution itself."73 Each institution estab-
lishes, maintains and is responsible for its own athletic programs.
This is evident by the fact that each school individually is conceiv-
ably subject to a Title VI suit.7 4 Therefore, it follows that the
schools themselves are in ultimate control and the NCAA only
structures the guidelines and rules which the schools wish to
implement. One example of this is Proposition 16, which was cre-
ated because the various heads of the institutions believed there
was a need for it. Also, the NCAA is a volunteer organization. The
schools may, if they desire, choose not to join the association. Sim-
ply because the organization is large and concededly powerful,
does not mean compliance or membership is mandatory. For
70. Id. (The court also noted: "The NCAA maintains that there is only an
administrative contract between itself and the Fund. However, the Court was
not presented with a copy of the contract . . .
71. Id.
72. Id. at 696.
73. Id. at 695 (quoting, NCAA Const., art. 6, rule 6.01.1).
74. Id. at 696.
1999] 241
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these reasons, the NCAA is not the "controlling authority" of the
federally funded programs.
In summary, the District Court applied the coverage of Title
VI too broadly in finding the NCAA subject to suit under the "indi-
rect recipient theory" and the "controlling authority" theory. Fur-
thermore, the NCAA should not be subject to these types of suits
because they are in conflict with the original reasoning behind the
creation of the organization. Allowing such lawsuits effectively
gives the courts (and in this case one judge) control over the deci-
sions for which the NCAA was explicitly created to regulate.
Surely, these matters are better left up to the NCAA, which
receives input from its member institutions when it makes
decisions.
B. The Three Prongs of the Disparate Impact Analysis
Even if the NCAA is subject to suit under Title VI, the court
should have nonetheless found that the disparate impact caused
by it implementation was justified. The doctrine of disparate
impact was introduced in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 75 The Griggs
case dealt with certain employment practices that Duke Power
used to determine who was eligible to get the higher paying jobs.76
The requirements included either a high school education, or the
passing of a standardized general intelligence test.77 The
Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether the
facially neutral employment selection practice was a violation of
Title V. 78 The Supreme Court reasoned that "the [Civil Rights]
Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."79 It went on to
state that "[tihe touchstone is business necessity."8 0 The stan-
dards for "business necessity" are synonymous with the standards
to determine if there is an "educational necessity."8 1 In order to be
a business necessity, the defendant is required to show the chal-
lenged practice has a "demonstrable relationship" to a legitimate
business goal.8 2
75. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 425-26.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 430.
80. Id.
81. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
82. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
242 [Vol. 22:233
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In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the United States
Supreme Court limited the reach of Griggs by defining the three
prong disparate impact analysis."3 The Supreme Court explicitly
stated that while the defendant carries a burden of producing evi-
dence of business justification, the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff at all times.84 The court defined the "necessity"
test as "whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way,
the legitimate goals of the employer." 5 Under this standard, the
court clearly stated that a challenged practice need not be "essen-
tial" or "indispensable" to the business to "pass muster," but it
must be more than "[a] mere insubstantial justification." 6 The
decision in Wards Cove appeared to take the bite out of Griggs by
giving more leeway to the employer in deciding what employment
practices to implement.
1. Prong One- The Prima Facie Case
In order for the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania to be
able to enjoin the NCAA from use of Proposition 16, it must first
determine that the rule has an unjustified disparate impact on the
protected group asserting the violation. In the first step the plain-
tiff must establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by "ini-
tially demonstrat[ing] that the application of a specific facially
neutral selection practice has caused an adverse disproportionate
effect, to wit, excluding the plaintiff and similarly situated appli-
cants from an educational opportunity."8 8 Judge Buckwalter,
relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove, stated
that "racially disproportionate effect is typically shown through
the presentation of competent statistical evidence comparing the
racial composition of candidates who are selected by the practice
in question and the racial composition of the qualified candidate
pool."8 9 There is no set number that automatically establishes
that a facially neutral practice is in effect a prima facie case of
83. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
84. Id. at 659.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Title VII-Evidentiary Requirements in Disparate-Impact Cases, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 350, 350-357 (1989). See generally Mack A. Player, Is Griggs
Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 Fla. St. U.
L. Rev. 1 (1989).
88. Id. See generally Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 642.
89. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
1999] 243
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disparate impact discrimination.9" However, in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank and Trust, the Supreme Court, in addressing the
issue, defined the applicable standard as "the plaintiff must offer
statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the
practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs
or promotions because of their membership in a protected
group."91 Simply put, the statistical evidence must be sufficient to
show causation.
92
In Cureton, the plaintiffs alleged Proposition 16, more specifi-
cally the 820 SAT cutoff score, had an unjustified disparate
impact. In order to make out the prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination against the facially neutral practice, the
plaintiffs relied on a July 27, 1998 NCAA memorandum; a July
29, 1994 memorandum; and a report prepared by the United
States Department of Education.93 In both memorandums, the
NCAA noted the disparate impact the rules in question (Proposi-
tion 16 and Proposition 48) had on minority student athletes. The
Department of Education report stated, among other things, that
"only 67.4% of African-American college-bound student-athletes
cleared the test score hurdle, as compared to 91.1% of white col-
lege-bound student-athletes."94
This evidence was particularly damning to the NCAA. Judge
Buckwalter rightly decided the evidence was sufficient to show
causation and held the plaintiffs had met the threshold test by
establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination
against African-Americans.9 5
2. Prong Two- Educational Necessity?
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case the burden of
rebuttal shifts to the defendant who must then show that the par-
ticular discriminatory selection practice is nonetheless justified by
an educational necessity.96 If the defendant cannot show the
selection practice is an educational necessity then the practice will
be found to be in violation of Title VI and therefore, illegal.9
90. Id.
91. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
92. Id. at 995.
93. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 698-699.
94. Id. at 699.
95. Id. at 700.
96. Id. at 697.
97. Id. at 714.
244 [Vol. 22:233
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The District Court, by purportedly applying the "educational
necessity" test elicited in Wards Cove, found that the NCAA failed
to sustain its burden of production on rebuttal. In defining the
NCAA's burden the court stated that "the defendant.., has some
burden of presenting objective evidence . . . factually showing a
nexus between the selection device and a particular [educational]
goal."98 In analyzing whether the NCAA had met its burden, the
court first determined whether the NCAA's goals were legiti-
mate.99 If the goals were found to be legitimate, then the court
would ask the crucial question of whether a "manifest relation-
ship" existed between the goals and the selection practice. 10 0
The NCAA proffered two reasons for the implementation of
Proposition 16: "(1) raising student-athlete graduation rates, and
(2) closing the gap between black and white student-athlete grad-
uation rates."10 1 The District Court accepted the first goal as a
legitimate educational goal for essentially two reasons. First, con-
sidering the purpose of the schools, it stated that "an educational
institution's primary mission is to educate and graduate as many
students as possible... Thus, raising graduation rates is directly
in line with that mission."102 Second, the court considered past
abuses where colleges accepted student-athletes who were athleti-
cally gifted, but ill prepared for the academic rigors of college. 10 3
It recognized that these past practices amounted to little more
than exploitation of student-athletes. The court concluded that
raising student-athlete graduation rates was a "legitimate goal
directed toward curbing the abuses .... 4
However, Judge Buckwalter refused to accept the NCAA's
goal of closing the gap between black and white student-athlete
graduation rates as legitimate.'0 5 The court found the goal to be
an unpersuasive, ad hoc argument, because the NCAA had not
mentioned this objective at any time previous to trial.10 6 Unlike
the first goal, it was not explicitly stated as one of the motivations
for adopting Proposition 48 and Proposition 16.107 The court con-
98. Id. at 701 (citations omitted).
99. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 703.
103. Id. at 704.
104. Id.
105. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
106. Id. at 705.
107. Id.
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ceded that it was "desirable" to close the gap between graduation
rates, but determined that it was simply a "collateral benefit" of
the rule.' It also found that the purported objective amounted to
an impermissible "bottom line" defense. The court concluded its
rejection by stating that "this explicitly race-based goal stands in
stark contrast to the characterization of Proposition 16 as a
facially neutral selection rule."10 9 As a result, according to the
court, the raising of student athlete graduation rates was the
NCAA's only legitimate reason for Proposition 16.
Next, the District Court addressed the issue of whether the
necessary "nexus" or "manifest relationship" existed between the
goal of raising graduation rates and the selection practice of Prop-
osition 16, i.e., the 820 SAT cutoff score." 0 The NCAA offered
numerous reasons why it used the SAT and ACT in determining
freshmen eligibility. Principle among the NCAA's reasons was the
value that courts have placed on standardized testing. "Courts
have recognized that the SAT and the ACT have been validated as
predictors of academic performance in college.""' Therefore, the
NCAA argued that a "cutoff score" was justified as a means to
achieve the goal of raising graduation rates. 1' 2 The court did not
completely rely on this argument, noting that "the SAT has only
been validated as a predictor of first-year GPA, and not college
graduation. " 1 3 In rebuttal, the plaintiffs did not attack the valid-
ity of standardized tests, but rather argued that the particular
cutoff score of 820 was arbitrary, irrational, and therefore,
unjustified. 114
Judge Buckwalter found the plaintiffs' approach persuasive
and stated that "to be legally justified, the NCAA must produce
evidence explaining why it chose the 820 cutoff score, as opposed
to any other cutoff score, aside from the fact that its members dis-
cussed and considered the matter in depth."" 5 In other words,
the NCAA had to have some "independent basis" for choosing the
820 cutoff score." 6 The District Court then listed three ways that
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 706.
111. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 706.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 707.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 709.
116. Id. at 708 (citing Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dep't, Inc.
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 105 (2d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 22:233246
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the NCAA could have shown that it had an independent basis for
choosing the score:
(1) [Ilts choice of an 820 cutoff score is reasonable and consistent
with normal expectations of the acceptable proficiency of student-
athletes... ;
(2)... its choice of a 820 cutoff score is the logical "break-point" in
the distribution of SAT scores relevant to meeting its goal of rais-
ing student-athlete graduation rates... ;
(3) .. .its choice of an 820 cutoff score is a valid measure of the
minimal ability necessary to raise the graduation rates of student-
athletes above those achieved prior to Proposition 16 .... ."'
The court found that the NCAA failed to justify the score
under any of these standards, stating "[the NCAA] relies .. .on
vague, unsupported notions such as the presumption 'that stu-
dents earning a [8201 SAT have serious reading problems'."118
The NCAA argued that it had chosen a score that had nonetheless
produced results, evident by the increase in the graduation rate
among student-athletes. 1 9 The court refused to accept this argu-
ment, holding that the NCAA had essentially picked a number
arbitrarily, and had engaged in a "wait and see" approach "to see
if the predicted effects and outcomes would come to pass."1 2 °
The District Court concluded that there was no manifest rela-
tionship between the objective and the cutoff score because the
NCAA had chosen the score in what the court regarded as an arbi-
trary fashion. 2' It necessarily followed under the disparate
impact analysis that the 820 cutoff score was not justified by a
"legitimate educational necessity."' 22 Therefore, Proposition 16
was found to be illegal under prong two of the analysis and in vio-
lation of Title VI.
The problem with the District Court's conclusion on this issue
is that it appears to be applying an analysis more akin to the one
applied in Griggs, rather than the more moderate version adopted
by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove. To reiterate, in Wards
Cove, the court stated that the defendant bore the burden of pro-
duction at the rebuttal stage, while the plaintiff at all times bore
117. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 710.
118. Id. (quoting 1995 NCAA Convention proceedings, at 258, NCAA 27549)
(alteration in original).
119. Id. at 705.
120. Id. at 708.
121. Id. at 712.
122. Id.
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the burden of persuasion. 123 In Cureton, whether intentional or
not, it was apparent that the burden of persuasion shifted to the
NCAA. The NCAA produced evidence of a legitimate goal and the
court accepted that goal as legitimate. The NCAA then produced
evidence that the facially neutral selection practice effectively
achieved that goal. Clearly, Proposition 16 produced results.
Therefore, the court should have found that the "challenged prac-
tice serve[d], in a significant way, the legitimate . . . goals of the
[NCAA]."' 2 4 If Judge Buckwalter had applied the more deferential
approach elicited in Wards Cove, the 820 cutoff score would have
been sustained as an educational necessity under prong two of the
disparate impact analysis.
3. Prong Three - Proffered Alternatives
In Wards Cove, the United States Supreme Court stated that
even if the defendant showed that the selection practice was justi-
fied by an "[educational] necessity," the plaintiff could still prevail
under prong three of the analysis. Prong three required plaintiffs
"to persuade the factfinder that 'other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly . . . undesirable effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate ... interest[s]' .... The Supreme Court
went on to explicitly state that an alternative selection practice,
although less discriminatory, may not suffice as a substitute.
"Any alternative practices which [plaintiffs] offer up in this
respect must be equally effective as [defendants'] chosen... proce-
dures in achieving [defendants'] legitimate . . . goals."' 26 The
Supreme Court clarified this analysis in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank and Trust. 127 In Watson, the Supreme Court pointed out
that the determination of whether an alternative is a "functional
equivalent" should include "[fi actors such as the cost or other bur-
dens of proposed alternative selection devices.' 28 In Wards Cove,
the Supreme Court concluded by expressing the concern that
courts should be leery of forcing defendants to adopt alternatives
because courts are not adept in these matters. 129
123. Wards Cove 490 U.S. at 658.
124. Id. at 659 (alteration in original).
125. Id. at 660 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975)) (alteration in original).
126. Id. at 661.
127. Watson, 487 U.S. 977.
128. Id. at 998.
129. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661.
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In Cureton, the plaintiffs proffered three alternatives. 130 The
first alternative lowered the cutoff score to 720 on the SAT (or 59
on the ACT). 3 ' Under this model, the "Overall Student-Athlete
Graduation Rate" was predicted to be 60.7%, a 1.1% difference
from the predicted 61.8% graduation rate of Proposition 16.132
The court found the crucial difference to be that, while under
Proposition 16, the "Black Ineligibility Rate" was 19.4%, but
under the plaintiffs' model, the rate was 15.9%.133 The second
alternative proffered by the plaintiffs extended the sliding scale
index to a 600 SAT score (or a 51 on the ACT).13 4 Under this
model the predicted graduation rate was 60%, while the black
ineligibility rate decreased to15.7%. The plaintiffs' final proffered
alternative was based on a full sliding scale index and completely
did away with a bottom line cutoff score. The final alternative
would allow "a student-athlete's eligibility [to] . . depend entirely
on an equally weighted combination of high school grades and
standardized test scores."135 Under this model, the overall gradu-
ation rate was predicted to be 59.8%, while the black ineligibility
rate decreased to 15.6%.136
The District Court found that the plaintiffs had also prevailed
under the third prong of the disparate impact analysis, stating
that "they have carried their burden of persuasion to proffer an
equally effective alternative practice that results in less racial dis-
proportionality while still serving the goal of raising student-ath-
lete graduation rates." 3 7 In arriving at this conclusion, the court
noted that prior to adoption of Proposition 48 in 1985, the student-
athlete graduation rate was 52% and even under the plaintiffs
final alternative there is a significant increase in the student-ath-
lete graduation rate. 138 The court conceded that Proposition 16
raised the graduation rate higher than the proffered alternatives,
but stated that:
[T]he NCAA has not demonstrated that there is something
special about the particular graduation rate. Indeed, it can only
be presumed that the goal of raising student-athlete graduation
130. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 713-14.
131. Id. at 713.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 714.
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rates embodies the NCAA's desire to raise them beyond the level
existing prior to the adoption of Proposition 16.139
Thus, the court found the plaintiffs to have sustained their
burden by producing "equally effective" alternatives. 140 The satis-
faction of this third prong led to the determination by the court
that the disparate impact caused by Proposition 16 was unjusti-
fied. Therefore, the court concluded that Proposition 16 was ille-
gal and in violation of Title VI. 41
There are some common sense problems with this analysis.
First, Judge Buckwalter relied on predicted outcomes, while the
effectiveness of Proposition 16 had already been demonstrated
through practice. Second, although the NCAA did not state a spe-
cific "desired" graduation rate, it should be acceptable that the
association would choose the selection practice that would best
serve to achieve their legitimate objective. Clearly, Proposition 16
was more effective at achieving the NCAA's goals than the prof-
fered alternatives and yet, the court was quick to label the prof-
fered models as "equally effective" alternatives.142 Finally, Judge
Buckwalter failed to heed the warning of the Supreme Court in
Wards Cove, that in disparate impact analysis employers are
given leeway in determining what policies to implement.143 The
District Court should tread lightly in matters best left to the insti-
tutions and organizations created to deal with them.
V. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the NCAA should not have been subject
to suit under Title VI because the association does not receive fed-
eral financial assistance within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(d). However, even if the NCAA was subject to suit, the
court should have found that the disparate impact caused by Prop-
osition 16 was justified by an educational necessity and that the
alternatives proffered by the plaintiffs were not "equally effective".
Furthermore, in making his final decision, Judge Buckwalter
should have considered some factors outside the rigid context of
legal analysis. First, the NCAA, through implementation of Prop-
osition 16, has set a standard applicable to all Division I schools
which helps ensure equity in competition among the institutions.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 713.
141. Id. at 714.
142. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
143. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661.
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If each college is left to determine their own standards, this equity
will be destroyed. Second, Proposition 16 does not hinder student-
athletes from playing sports and receiving scholarships; it merely
reserves those awards for the students who have worked hard to
earn them. Surely, it would be unfair to take a scholarship from a
good player who has strived to do well in academics, and give it to
another student who did not apply himself, but happens to shows
more potential as a ball player. It is important to remember that
education, not athletics, is the backbone of colleges. Finally, by
lowering the cutoff score the likelihood of exploitation increases
and that is the very evil Proposition16 was created to guard
against. For the preceding reasons, the NCAA should not have
been enjoined from use of Proposition 16.
Dennis L. Martin
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